We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price-sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete-information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations. KEYWORDS: Stable matching, incomplete information, incomplete information core, premuneration values. 2 See Roth and Sotomayer (1990) for a survey of two-sided matching theory. 3 Moreover, there is no mechanism yielding stable matchings under which the truthful revelation of preferences is a dominant strategy for all agents (Roth (1982) ), and hence incomplete information will, in general, have substantive behavioral implications.
INTRODUCTION
A LARGE LITERATURE USES the matching models introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) to analyze markets with twosided heterogeneity, studying problems such as the matching of undergraduates to universities, husbands to wives, and workers to firms. 2 The typical analysis in this literature assumes that the agents have complete information, and then examines stable outcomes. A proposed outcome that matches each firm to a worker (for example), along with a specification of a payment from the firm to the worker, is stable if there is no unmatched worker-firm pair that could increase both their payoffs by matching with each other and making an appropriate payment.
The assumption of complete information makes the analysis tractable but is stringent. 3 This paper examines matching models in which the agents on one side of the market cannot observe the characteristics of those on the other side, addressing the following questions. What does it mean for an outcome to be stable under incomplete information? What are the properties of stable outcomes? To what extent does the introduction of asymmetric information in a matching problem alter equilibrium outcomes?
Beliefs
Our first order of business is to formulate an appropriate modification of stability for problems in which there is asymmetric information. The key to our stability notion is a specification of the beliefs of the agents who might block a candidate stable allocation.
Consider a worker/firm matching problem in which each worker and each firm has a type that is their "quality," and any matched worker-firm pair can generate a surplus that is increasing in both qualities. Suppose that firms' qualities are commonly known, but workers' qualities are not. Each firm knows the quality of the worker she is matched with, and knows the payments in other worker-firm pairs, but not the workers' qualities in those pairs. As in the complete-information framework, we would say that the outcome is not stable if there is an unmatched worker-firm pair that can deviate and increase the payoff to each. But how does the firm estimate her payoff when deviating to match with a worker whose quality is unknown? What beliefs should she use in calculating her expected payoffs?
We begin by identifying the beliefs the firm can exclude, given her knowledge of the allocation and the hypothesis that this allocation is not blocked. In particular, the firm may make inferences about workers' types from the lack of worker-firm pairs wishing to block. These inferences may lead to yet further inferences. We construct an iterative belief-formation process, reminiscent of rationalizability, that captures all such inferences the firm can make. This, in general, gives rise to a set of "reasonable" beliefs for the firm. We then say that an allocation fails to be stable if some worker-firm pair has a deviation that is profitable, under any reasonable belief the firm might have.
In motivating this final step, we must distinguish between the viewpoint of the firm and that of the analyst. The firm has some particular belief, drawn from the set of reasonable beliefs, and will participate in a blocking match if it gives her an expected payoff gain, given those beliefs. However, nothing in the structure of the economy or the candidate stable allocation gives the analyst any clue as to what the firm's (reasonable) belief might be. Our goal is to identify the necessary conditions for stability that follow only from the structure of the economy and the hypothesis of stability, and we accordingly reject an allocation only if we are certain there is a successful block. One might seek sharper predictions by augmenting our model with a theory of how firms form beliefs, just as one might impose additional structure to choose between multiple core or complete-information stable outcomes in other circumstances, but we view this as a subsequent exercise.
When is our analysis applicable, or equivalently, how does an allocation and its immunity to blocking come to be commonly known? Our view is that a stable allocation is one that we should expect to persist, and we thus think of the agents in the model repeatedly observing this allocation. Each time they ob-serve the allocation, 4 they can draw further inferences about its propertiesfirst, that it is individually rational, then, that everyone knows it is individually rational and (given this knowledge) there are no blocking pairs, then, that everyone knows that . . . , and so on. Each observation corresponds to a step in our iterative belief process, with successive beliefs pushing the agents closer to common knowledge of an allocation's immunity to blocking. A finite number of rounds suffices to determine which allocations are commonly known to be immune to blocking.
Necessary Conditions
We do not address how stable outcomes might arise. We view our incompleteinformation stability concept as being applied to identify the set of possible incomplete-information stable outcomes, regardless of how they might arise, in much the same way that one studies direct mechanisms to identify the set of implementable outcomes in a mechanism design context. Identifying which stable outcome will appear requires additional institutional information, just as identifying which outcome will be implemented typically requires information about the actual indirect mechanism.
This approach to incomplete-information stability is reminiscent of the study of the core, which (following its formalization by Gillies (1959) ) was long used to identify candidates for stability before processes were identified that would reliably lead to core outcomes (e.g., Perry and Reny (1994) ). In contrast, the notion of stability and a centralized algorithm for computing stable allocations appeared simultaneously in the study of complete-information matching (Gale and Shapley (1962) ). One can imagine a decentralized process that would seemingly lead to stable outcomes under complete information-unmatched agents randomly meet each other and make proposals, with the process stopping when no unmatched pair can improve on their situation by matchingbut Lauermann and Nöldeke (2014) demonstrated that only under restrictive assumptions do the obvious such processes lead to stable outcomes (see Section 6.2). Under incomplete information, the outcome of such a process is even less obvious, because agents make inferences from intermediate outcomes during the matching process, so the set of possible incomplete-information stable outcomes becomes a "moving target." Providing decentralized foundations for both complete-and incomplete-information stable matchings is an open and obviously interesting problem. We return to this issue in Section 6.
Our notion of stability precludes profitable pairwise deviations, but does not consider deviations by larger groups of agents. Under complete information, pairs can block any outcome blocked by larger coalitions (i.e., the set of pairwise stable outcomes coincides with the core), and hence restricting attention to pairwise stability sacrifices no generality. This need not be the case with incomplete information. Given our assumption that in a proposed matching, firms know the quality of the worker with whom they are matched, a coalition that includes more than a single firm potentially has more information at their disposal than does any single pair-"potentially" because one would have to specify the process by which firms communicated, presumably accounting for incentives, in order to characterize the information at their disposal. In many circumstances, we view it as reasonable that the obvious potential blocking coalitions are pairs. We readily imagine a worker seeking a new job or a firm trying to poach a worker, but less readily imagine a set of firms entering into an agreement to reallocate their workers among themselves. Moreover, allowing only pairs to deviate avoids the information-sharing difficulties that would arise with larger coalitions.
Preview
Sections 2 and 3 develop our stability concept for matching problems with incomplete information. Under general conditions, incomplete-information stable outcomes exist in incomplete-information environments.
Section 4 explores the implications of our notion of incomplete-information stability. Under intuitive sufficient conditions, these outcomes are efficient (in the sense of maximizing total surplus), but, in general, can fail equal treatment of equals. Incomplete-information stable outcomes are a superset of completeinformation stable outcomes. In particular, incomplete-information stable outcomes may be efficient, and hence yield the same matching as would complete information, but involve different payments. These payments are important when considering settings in which firms or workers (or both) invest in their characteristics (types) before they enter the matching market. 5 The payments then determine investment incentives, and so the efficiency of the investment decisions.
Finally, we establish continuity results. Agents' payoffs in stable incompleteinformation problems with "little" asymmetry of information are close to the payoffs to those with no asymmetry of information. This provides the robustness result that one need not literally believe in complete information, instead being confident of a complete-information analysis as long as there is not too much one-sided uncertainty in the economy.
Section 5 introduces a notion of price-sustainable allocations and shows that the set of stable outcomes is a (in general, strict) subset of the set of such allocations.
We are not the first to study these kinds of questions, and we discuss the related literature in Section 6.
MATCHING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

The Environment
We generalize the complete-information matching models studied by Shapley and Shubik (1971) and Crawford and Knoer (1981) . There is a finite set of workers, I, with an individual worker denoted by i ∈ I. There is also a finite set of firms, J, with an individual firm denoted by j ∈ J. Indices identify agents, but do not play a direct role in production. We use male pronouns for workers and female for firms.
The productive characteristics of an agent are described by the agent's type, with W ⊂ R being the finite set of possible worker types and F ⊂ R being the finite set of possible firm types. The function mapping each firm to her type is denoted by f : J → F . The function mapping each worker to his type is denoted by w : I → W .
Value is generated by matches. We take as primitive the aggregate match value each agent receives in the absence of any payments between the agents. Following Samuelson (2012, 2013) , we call these values premuneration values. For example, the firm's premuneration value may include the net output produced by the worker with whom the firm is matched, the cost of the unemployment insurance premiums the firm must pay, and (depending on the legal environment) the value of any patents secured as a result of the worker's activities. The worker's premuneration value may include the value of the human capital the worker accumulates while working with the firm, the value of contacts the worker makes in the course of his job, and (again depending on the legal environment) the value of any patents secured as a result of the worker's activities.
A match between worker type w ∈ W and firm type f ∈ F gives rise to the worker premuneration value ν wf ∈ R and firm premuneration value φ wf ∈ R. We call the sum of the premuneration values, ν wf + φ wf , the surplus of the match. We avoid having to continually make special note of nuisance cases by also defining the premuneration values of an unmatched worker and an unmatched firm, which we take (without loss of generality) to be zero, denoting these values by ν w(∅) f (j) for the worker and φ w(i) f (∅) for the firm.
Each firm's index is commonly known, as is the function f, and hence each firm's type is common knowledge. On the other hand, while a worker's index is common knowledge, the function w (and hence workers' types) will, in general, not be known (though workers will know their own types). We assume the worker type assignment w is drawn from some distribution with support Ω ⊂ W I . As will be clear, while the support plays an important role in the analysis, the distribution does not. The functions ν : W × F → R and φ : W × F → R are common knowledge.
Given a match between worker i (of type w(i)) and firm j (of type f(j)), the worker's payoff is
where p ∈ R is the (possibly negative) payment made to worker i by firm j.
A matching function is a function μ : I → J ∪ {∅}, one-to-one on μ −1 (J), that assigns worker i to firm μ(i), where μ(i) = ∅ means that worker i is unemployed and μ −1 (j) = ∅ means that firm j does not hire a worker. The outcome of such a function is a matching.
A payment scheme p associated with a matching function μ is a vector that specifies a payment p i μ(i) ∈ R for each i ∈ I and p μ −1 (j) j ∈ R for each j ∈ J. To again avoid nuisance cases, we associate zero payments with unmatched agents, setting p ∅j = p i∅ = 0. DEFINITION 1: An allocation (μ p) consists of a matching function μ and a payment scheme p associated with μ. An outcome of the matching game (μ p w f) specifies a realized type assignment (w f) and an allocation (μ p).
An Example
We illustrate the environment and preview our stability notion. There are three workers and firms (I = J = {a b c}). The set of possible worker types is W = {1 2 3} and the set of possible firm types is F = {2 4 5}. The firm type assignment is given by f(a) = 2, f(b) = 4, and f(c) = 5. A worker of type w and a firm with type f generate a premuneration value wf to each agent, that is, ν wf = φ wf = wf .
Complete Information
Suppose the worker type assignment is w(a) = 1, w(b) = 3, and w(c) = 2, and that this is commonly known. The notion of stability for this completeinformation setting is familiar from Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) . Because the surplus function is supermodular, the only stable matching must be positive assortative in type, which is the efficient matching in the sense of maximizing total surplus (Shapley and Shubik (1971) ).
To illustrate the reasoning behind this result, consider the matching shown in Figure 1 , which is not assortative. Since the matching of worker b (who has type 3) with firm b (who has type 4) generates a surplus of 24, we have π w b + π f b = 24, and similarly π w c + π f c = 20. But the surplus generated by a positive assortative matching by type of the top two workers and firms is 46. In the candidate match of Figure 1 , either π w b + π f c < 30 or π w c + π f b < 16, and hence either worker b and firm c, or worker c and firm b, can form a blocking coalition (i.e., can match and make a payment under which both receive more than under the candidate match). 
Incomplete Information
Now suppose that the firms know the workers' indices, know the set of possible worker types W = {1 2 3}, and know the type of worker with whom they are matched, but do not know the function w assigning types to indices. Suppose the realized types and the matching of firms to workers are as in Figure 1 , with the payments and payoffs shown in Figure 2 . Firms believe the set Ω of possible vectors (w(a) w(b) w(c)) is (in this example) the set of permutations of (1 2 3). Hence, each firm knows there is one worker of type 1, one worker of type 2, and one worker of type 3, and knows the type of her own worker, but does not know the types of the other two workers. We consider a stability notion analogous to that of the complete-information case, namely, that there be no unmatched pair who can find an agreement that both prefer to the proposed outcome. Consider a candidate blocking pair consisting of worker c, firm b, and some paymentp ∈ (−2 0). Under complete information, this would indeed be a blocking pair. Under incomplete information, it is again immediate that any such agreement makes a worker of type 2 better off than in the proposed outcome, and hence satisfies one condition for being a blocking pair. However, firm b does not know whether worker c is of type 1 or type 2. The proposed deal is advantageous for firm b if the worker is type 2, but not if the worker is type 1.
Is this a blocking pair? To answer this question, both here and in general, we must take a stand on what beliefs the firm is likely to have about the type of worker in a proposed blocking pair. Our requirement will be that a pair can block only if both agents expect higher payoffs, given any reasonable beliefs the firm might have over the support of possible worker types. Could the firm reasonably expect worker c to be type 1? It initially appears that this is the case, since firm b knows only that worker c is not of type 3. However, the firm may be able to refine her beliefs on the strength of the fact that worker c is willing to participate in the block. To pursue this, notice that if worker c were type 1, his current payoff would be 1, while he would receive a payoff of 4 +p in the candidate blocking pair. Since 4 +p > 1 for allp ∈ (−2 0), the candidate blocking pair is also advantageous for a worker of type 1. Firm b then cannot be sure whether the proposal involves a worker of type 1 or type 2. Hence, the firm might reasonably believe the worker is of type 1, making the proposed deal disadvantageous for the firm. The allocation illustrated in Figure 2 thus appears to be incomplete-information stable.
However, the argument does not end here. The "reasonable" requirement we place on the firms' beliefs is that the support of a firm's beliefs be consistent with all of the inferences the firm can draw, using the firm's information and the hypothesis that the candidate allocation is known not to be blocked. In this case, firm b can reason as follows: Suppose worker c were of type 1. Then firm c would receive a payoff of 9, worker a would be of type 2 and receive payoff 4, and firm c would know that worker a was of type at least 2. Worker a and firm c could then match at payment of 0 (for example), giving each a higher payoff than the candidate stable allocation and thus constituting a blocking pair. But firm b's working hypothesis is that the proposed allocation is not blocked, and hence that there is no such blocking pair. Then worker c cannot be of type 1, and hence must be of type 2. This ensures that the originally proposed block is profitable for firm c, and hence that we indeed have a successful block. The allocation illustrated in Figure 2 is thus not incomplete-information stable.
The central issue addressed in this paper is to make precise, and then explore, the implications of this belief-formation process.
Incomplete Information: Inference
Firm b's inference in the preceding section does not hinge critically on the strong assumptions made about the possible worker type distributions. In particular, we preview a general result: if premuneration values are increasing and strictly supermodular, then only positive assortative matchings can be stable.
The firms' types are again given by f(a) = 2, f(b) = 4, and f(c) = 5. Assume nothing more about worker types than that the set of possibilities is W = {1 2 3}. Workers' types may be drawn independently from this set, or may be drawn according to any other procedure. Premuneration values are given by ν wf = φ wf = wf .
We first argue that the lowest type worker must be matched with the lowest type firm. Consider the matching in Figure 3 , which pairs the worker of the lowest type with the firm of the second lowest type.
Suppose first that p aa > 4 + p bb and consider a candidate blocking pair involving worker b, firm a, and payment p = (p aa + p bb )/2. Worker b strictly prefers the resulting payoff to the current matching, since 2 + p > 4 + p bb . Moreover, a lower bound on firm a's payoff in such a match is provided by assuming that worker b has type 1, and so firm a also finds such an offer strictly preferable to the current matching, since 2−p > 4 − p aa . Suppose instead that p aa ≤ 4 + p bb and consider a candidate blocking pair involving worker a, firm b, and payment p = p aa − 3. Worker a strictly prefers the resulting payoff to the current matching, since 8 + p > 4 + p aa . In computing a lower bound on her payoff in worker payoffs, π w i : 4+ p aa 4 + p bb 15 + p cc worker types, w: such a match, firm b should understand that worker a of type 1 does not find such a match attractive, since 4 + p < 2 + p aa . Under the belief that worker a has type at least 2, firm b then also finds the match strictly preferable to the current matching, since 8 − p > 4 − p bb .
This ensures that the lowest types of firm and worker must be matched. As we show in Section 4.1.2, this logic can be iterated to show that the lowest two types of workers must be matched with the lowest two types of firms, the lowest three types of workers with the lowest three types, and so on, giving the result that when premuneration values are supermodular, only positive assortative matchings can be stable.
STABILITY
Individual Rationality
A matching is individually rational if each agent receives at least as high a payoff as provided by the outside option of remaining unmatched, that is, receives at least zero. Since firms observe the types of workers with whom they are matched at the interim stage, the notion of individual rationality is the same for complete and incomplete information.
Complete-Information Stability
The notion of stability in matching games with transferable utility was first formulated by Shapley and Shubik (1971) , who also established existence. Crawford and Knoer (1981) provided a constructive proof of existence by applying a deferred acceptance algorithm to a model with discrete payments. DEFINITION 3: A matching outcome (μ p w f) is complete-information stable if it is individually rational, and there is no worker-firm combination (i j) and payment p ∈ R from j to i such that
If (μ p w f) is a complete-information stable outcome, the allocation (μ p) is a complete-information stable allocation at (w f).
It is well known that for each type assignment (w f), a complete-information stable allocation exists, is efficient, and agents on the same side of the market obtain the same payoffs if they have the same types (equal treatment of equals).
Incomplete Information
We are interested in the stability of a matching when each worker knows his type, but the worker type assignment is not known by any agent. We view stability as capturing a notion of steady state: a matching is stable if, once established, it remains in place. Think of workers and firms in the labor market observing a particular matching (together with its associated payments). If the matching is stable, then we should expect to see the same matching when next the labor market opens, and each subsequent time the labor market opens. To make this operational, we characterize the implications of having the immunity of the matching to blocking be common knowledge.
We emphasize what a firm can observe: the types of all firms, the distribution from which the function assigning workers' types is drawn, the type of the firm's current worker, and which worker is matched with which firm at which payment. Hence, a firm assessing a candidate block involving worker i knows the identity and type of the employer with whom i is matched in the supposed stable allocation and his payment.
We model the firms' inferences via a procedure of iterated elimination of blocked matching outcomes. This formulation resembles the game-theoretic notion of rationalizability (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) ), obtained via iterated elimination of strategies that are never best responses, though a better analogy may be the deductive iterations that arise in the classic "colored hats" problem with which discussions of common knowledge are often introduced (Geanakoplos (1994 (Geanakoplos ( , p. 1439 ). Similar reasoning lies behind the no-trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) .
Consider a firm contemplating a blocking match with a worker, knowing that the realization of worker types is consistent with a set of matching outcomes Σ, and suppose the firm has a probability distribution over those consistent worker types. The firm would agree to a contemplated change in partner only if the expected payoff from doing so was positive. Typically, a variety of probability beliefs over worker types will be consistent with Σ, with a contemplated change having a positive expected value for some beliefs and a negative one for others. If the expected payoff of the change is positive for every belief the firm might have, we do not need to know the firm's beliefs to be sure the firm will agree to the change. Our notion of blocking is designed to only exclude outcomes that we can be certain will give rise to objection: DEFINITION 4: Fix a nonempty set of individually rational matching outcomes, Σ. A matching outcome (μ p w f) ∈ Σ is Σ-blocked if there is a worker-firm pair (i j) and payment p ∈ R satisfying
Inequality (1) requires that worker i receive a higher payoff in the potential block than under the match. Inequality (2) requires that firm j expect a higher payoff in the proposed block than under the match, for any reasonable beliefs the firm might have over worker type assignments. Our notion of "reasonable" only restricts the supports of such beliefs, and so we suppress the beliefs, describing the restrictions on the supports directly. To qualify as reasonable, a type assignment must satisfy three criteria, given by (3)-(5): (3) the type assignment must be consistent with matching outcomes in the set Σ, a restriction that will become operational in the iterative argument we construct next; (4) the type assignment must not contradict what the firm j already knows at the interim stage, that is, it must be consistent with the type of firm j's current worker μ −1 (j); and (5) the type of worker i with whom j is matched in the potential block must be consistent with i's incentives (i.e., the type of this worker should be better off than under that worker's current match).
The argument in Section 2.2.3 shows that the matching outcome of Figure 3 is Σ 0 -blocked, where Σ 0 is the set of all individually rational matching outcomes, irrespective of the level of payments. That argument is general, and shows that if premuneration values are increasing and strictly supermodular, no matching outcome is Σ 0 -stable if a matched lowest type of worker and a lowest type of firm are not matched with each other (Lemma B.3). In other cases, the precise nature of the payments determines whether the matching outcome is Σ 0 -blocked. For example, the matching outcome in Figure 4 may or may not be Σ 0 -blocked, depending on p. Suppose first that p cc = −2, and consider a candidate blocking pair consisting of worker b (who has type 3) and firm c, with payment p ∈ (1 2). Worker b prefers this resulting match to the proposed equilibrium outcome. Moreover, firm c can calculate that a worker worker payoffs, π w i : 2 16 10 + p cc worker types, w: matched with firm b would prefer such an alternative match if and only if the worker is of type 3, ensuring that firm c also strictly prefers the candidate blocking match and hence that the candidate outcome is Σ 0 -blocked. In contrast, the outcome with p cc = −4 (the outcome from Figure 2 ) is Σ 0 -stable: Note first that worker b and firm c can no longer block because the total payoff of the pair equals their surplus were that pair to match. Moreover, it is an implication of the discussion in Section 2.2.2 that worker c and firm b cannot form a blocking pair.
While Definition 4 suppresses the role of beliefs, our preferred interpretation is that firms are expected profit maximizers. In particular, when evaluating a potential blocking match with worker i, firm j evaluates the profitability from such a match using her beliefs over worker i's possible type to calculate expected profits. Of course, if a firm-worker pair blocks a particular match, this does not mean the resulting match is stable. The new match may itself be blocked, and the fact that a worker-pair blocked the initial match may change some firms' information. We are interested in understanding the set of potential final outcomes of such a process, that is, the set of outcomes that are immune to further such changes, without assuming too much about the nature of the protocol (extensive form) of firm-worker interactions and without assuming anything about the firms' beliefs beyond that implied by the common knowledge of the matching. Toward this end, we exclude an allocation only if we can identify a block for which we are confident the firm believes she benefits. We accordingly require that the firm believe the blocking is profitable under all reasonable beliefs, restricted only by the common knowledge of the structure of the matching. The set of incomplete-information stable outcomes is given by
Consider the outcome in Figure 2 . We argued earlier that this outcome is Σ 0 -stable. Hence that outcome is in Σ 1 . However, the outcome is Σ 1 -blocked and hence is not contained in Σ 2 , because outcomes with w (c) = 1 (such as the one displayed in Figure 5 ) are not contained in Σ 1 (for Figure 5 , there is a successful block at the payment p = − 1 2 of worker c with firm a). The sequence Σ k is a (weakly) decreasing sequence of sets of outcomes. As stated in the next proposition, it is straightforward to see that the limit of the sequence, Σ ∞ , is nonempty.
PROPOSITION 1: For each type assignment (w f), there is an incompleteinformation stable outcome (μ p w f), and so the set of incomplete-information stable allocations is nonempty.
Fixed-Point Characterization
The iterative procedure of Definition 5 describes an algorithm for obtaining the set of all incomplete-information stable allocations. This set has a fixedpoint characterization, which is often more convenient for verifying that a given matching outcome is stable.
DEFINITION 6: A nonempty set of individually rational matching outcomes
We now summarize several useful properties of a self-stabilizing set of matching outcomes (the proof is in Appendix A.1). Note that the first claim trivially yields existence, since complete-information stable outcomes always exist in our setting.
The following proposition provides a fixed-point characterization of the set of stable outcomes (the proof is in Appendix A.2):
The set of incomplete-information stable outcomes, Σ ∞ , is a self-stabilizing set, and hence the largest self-stabilizing set.
3. The set Σ ∞ is closed.
One immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that, to show (μ p w f) is a stable outcome, it suffices to construct a subset Ω * containing w stabilizing the allocation (μ p).
IMPLICATIONS OF INCOMPLETE-INFORMATION STABILITY
Allocative Efficiency
Payoff Assumptions
While our notion of incomplete-information stability is based upon a demanding notion of blocking and hence is relatively permissive, under natural assumptions on premuneration values, stable matchings maximize total surplus. We consider the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1-Monotonicity: The worker premuneration values ν wf and firm premuneration values φ wf are increasing in w and f , with ν wf strictly increasing in w and φ wf strictly increasing in f .
ASSUMPTION 2-Supermodularity: The worker premuneration value ν wf and the match surplus ν wf + φ wf are strictly supermodular in w and f . ASSUMPTION 3-Submodularity: The worker premuneration value ν wf and the match surplus ν wf + φ wf are strictly submodular in w and f .
We focus the discussion on the case in which Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
The assumption of supermodularity is common in the literature on labor markets and marriage markets. Its sorting implications in matching markets were first studied by Becker (1973) . Note that the supermodularity/submodularity assumptions are imposed on the worker premuneration values and on total surplus, but not separately on firm premuneration values.
Efficiency Under Supermodularity
Under supermodularity, a firm faced with evaluating its participation in a potential blocking pair can draw relatively sharp inferences about the type of worker from the worker's willingness to participate in a blocking coalition at the associated payment. The following lemma identifies conditions under which a firm entertaining a deviation to match with a worker of unknown type can be certain of a lower bound on the worker's type (the proof is in Appendix B.1).
LEMMA 2: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 (supermodularity) hold, and (μ p w f) is individually rational. If a type w * worker is matched with a type f * firm at a payment p * , then, for any firm with type f > f * , there exists ε > 0 such that, for
If w * is unmatched in an individually rational matching outcome, then for, any firm type f , there exists ε > 0 such that, for any
The interpretation is as follows. Suppose a worker is willing to participate in a blocking pair with a firm of type f > f * , where f * is the type of the worker's current match, at a payment of p just above ν w * f * + p * − ν w * f . The type f firm understands that the worker benefits from participating if and only if his type is at least w * . Condition (6) says that all worker types higher than or equal to w * prefer working for a type f firm under a payment p to remaining in the old match; (7) says that matching with a type f firm is individually rational; (8) says that if worker type is lower than w * , then the worker prefers to stay in the candidate matching.
Under supermodularity, an outcome is efficient (i.e., maximizes total surplus) only if it features positive assortative matching. In addition, efficiency requires that pairs producing negative surpluses are not matched. Incompleteinformation stability guarantees both properties, and so all stable outcomes are efficient. Appendix B proves the following. PROPOSITION 3: Under Assumptions 1 (monotonicity) and 2 (supermodularity), every incomplete-information stable outcome is efficient.
We now describe an example demonstrating that without strict supermodularity, stable outcomes may be inefficient. There are two workers and two firms. It is commonly known that f(a) = 1, f(b) = 2, and w(b) = 2. We suppose that worker a's type could be either 1 or 3, and the realized value is 3. The worker's premuneration value is w + f (thus violating strict supermodularity), while the firm's premuneration value is the product of the types in a match, wf .
We claim that the first matching outcome in Figure 6 is an inefficient, incomplete-information stable outcome (μ p w f). To show (μ p w f) is an incomplete-information stable outcome, we use Proposition 2 and show that the set E = {(μ p w f) (μ p w f)} is a self-stabilizing set, where (μ p w f) is given by the second matching.
First note that (μ p w f) is a complete-information stable outcome, and hence is self-stabilizing as a singleton set. This outcome stabilizes (μ p w f) as follows. The only potential blocking pair at type assignment (w f) involves worker a and firm b. However, workers of type 1 and type 3 would both be willing to participate in such a block at any price greater than −1, and hence there is no way for firm b to exclude the possibility that worker a is type 1. The allocation then cannot be blocked, and hence we have incomplete-information stability.
Efficiency Under Submodularity
Under submodularity, an outcome is efficient only if it features negative assortative matching. In addition, efficiency may require certain agents to be unmatched. Just as with supermodular values, firms can draw relatively sharp inferences about the type of worker from the worker's willingness to participate in a blocking coalition at the associated payment. Using Lemma 2's analogue (see Supplemental Material Section O.1.1 (Liu, Mailath, Postlewaite, and Samuelson (2014))), we show that incomplete-information stability guarantees negative assortative matching.
However, incomplete-information stability may support "too much" matching. Consider the following example with three types of firms and five types of workers. Workers and firms receive the same premuneration values in a match; these values are described in Figure 7 . These premuneration values are submodular. 7 As usual, we have normalized names so that worker a matches with firm a, worker b with firm b, and worker c with firm c. The firm type assignment is f(a) = 3, f(b) = 2, and f(c) = 1. Suppose Ω = W I , and consider the pair of worker type assignments, w = (1 2 5) and w = (1 3 4). A self-stabilizing set is given in Figure 8 . -Submodular worker and firm premuneration values for the example illustrating "too much" matching under incomplete-information stability. 7 Since the matches of worker types 1 and 2 with a firm type 1 yield negative surpluses in Figure 7 , we are effectively assuming that agents in a match cannot simply ignore their partners and guarantee a value of 0. However, the relevant features of the example are unchanged if we replace the negative values with zeroes. While the resulting premuneration values are not globally submodular, they are submodular on the restricted domain where premuneration values are strictly positive. The matching outcome on the right of Figure 8 , though incompleteinformation stable, is inefficient (see Figure 9 ). This inefficiency arises from two aspects: the efficient outcome involves some unmatched agents, and the two worker type assignment functions in the self-stabilizing set "cross." In particular, at w , w is the firm 3 pessimistic worker type assignment, and yet under that type assignment, the worker matched with firm 1 has a higher type than under w .
Eliminating the possibility of unmatched pairs in an efficient matching is sufficient to guarantee the efficiency of incomplete-information outcomes. Supplemental Material Section O.1 proves the following proposition. Say that an outcome is negative assortative if, for all i i ∈ I such that μ(i) μ(i ) ∈ J, if w(i) < w(i ), then f(μ(i)) ≥ f(μ(i )). Note that this notion of negative assortativity does not impose any restrictions on the type of unmatched agents. 
Failure of Equal Treatment of Equals
The equal treatment of equals is a basic notion of fairness, and is trivially satisfied by stable outcomes in complete-information environments. We have shown that under strict supermodularity and monotonicity, incompleteinformation stable matchings exhibit a strong efficiency property. A natural question is whether we also obtain fairness, in the sense of equal treatment of equals.
We now show by example that equal treatment of equal worker types can fail. There are two firms, each of type 2, and two workers, with types drawn independently from the set {1 2}. Premuneration values are wf for both workers and firms. Consider the first matching outcome (μ p w f) in Figure 10 . This matching outcome violates equal treatment of equals, since the workers are of the same type but receive different payoffs. If there were complete information, the first worker and the second firm would form a blocking pair.
To establish incomplete-information stability, we construct an argument reminiscent of that used in the previous example. We show that (μ p w f) is part of a self-stabilizing set. The easiest way to do so is to consider a set of two outcomes, the second of which ((μ p w f) ) is complete-information stable.
Consider the self-stabilizing set E = {(μ p w f) (μ p w f)}, where (μ p w f) is given by the second matching outcome in Figure 10 . The latter is complete-information stable, so we need only show that (μ p w f) is incomplete-information stable, for which it suffices to show that a coalition consisting of worker a and firm b cannot block (μ p w f). This follows from the possibility that worker a is of type 1 rather than type 2, since any payment inducing a type 2 worker to participate in such a blocking pair would also induce a type 1 worker to participate. 
Relation to Complete-Information Stability
Proposition 1 established that any complete-information stable outcome is incomplete-information stable. The examples in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2 present incomplete-information stable outcomes that are not complete-information stable. The set of incomplete-information stable outcomes is thus a strict superset of the set of complete-information outcomes. This section describes settings in which the two concepts are close or coincide.
Almost Complete Information: Continuity
We first seek a continuity result. The motivation for such a result is straightforward. We believe that matching environments invariably involve at least some asymmetry of information. At the same time, complete-information models are convenient. It would then be similarly convenient if the equilibrium outcomes of our complete-information matching models are "close" to the outcomes of incomplete-information matching models when the asymmetry of information is small. Since our notion of incomplete-information stability depends only on the support of the distribution determining worker type assignments, our notion of close is necessarily strong in that it requires the supports to be close.
We cannot expect such a continuity result without continuity in premuneration values:
ASSUMPTION 4-Continuity: The premuneration values ν wf and φ wf are continuous in w.
Fix a type assignment w ∈ R I and fix δ > 0, and denote by ξ δ (w) a δneighborhood of w in the Euclidean metric. Since we will be varying the support Ω, we make the dependence of the set of incomplete-information stable outcomes on the support Ω explicit by denoting that set by Σ ∞ (Ω). Note that the set of complete-information stable outcomes for a given worker type assignment w can be written as Σ ∞ ({w}). Let π(μ p w f) ∈ R I×J be the vector of payoffs that workers and firms receive in the matching outcome (μ p w f), and denote by π(Σ ∞ (Ω)) ⊂ R I×J the set of payoff vectors associated with the set of matching outcomes Σ ∞ (Ω). Denote by ξ δ (π(Σ ∞ (Ω))) the δ-neighborhood of the set π(Σ ∞ (Ω)), that is,
We then have that if there is almost complete information about a worker type assignment w, then the set of incomplete-information stable outcomes is close to the set of complete-information outcomes in terms of payoffs (the proof is in Appendix C.1).
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose Assumption 4 holds. Fix a type assignment w ∈ R I . For any ε > 0, there exists δ > 0 such that π(Σ ∞ (Ω)) ⊂ ξ ε (π(Σ ∞ ({w}))) for any finite set Ω ⊂ ξ δ (w).
Restrictions of Workers' Types
The examples in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2 present incomplete-information stable outcomes that are not complete-information stable. In these examples, workers' types are determined by independent draws. One's intuition is that firms are able to infer relatively little about workers' types in such an environment. Firms might be able to draw stronger inferences, and the set of incomplete-information stable outcomes might be close to the set of completeinformation stable outcomes, if there is correlation among workers' types.
This section considers a very strong restriction on the set of possible worker type assignments:
DEFINITION 7: The support Ω is a set of permutations if, for any w w ∈ Ω, there exists a one-to-one mapping ι : I → I such that w(i) = w (ι(i)).
The types were drawn from a set of permutations in Section 2.2.2. For the result in this subsection, we focus on the case where |I| = |J| and assume that ν wf > 0 and φ wf > 0 for any w ∈ W and f ∈ F .
A plausible conjecture is that when there are at least as many distinct types of firms as workers, assortative matching identifies worker types from the firm types with which they are matched, and hence incomplete-information stability implies complete-information stability. We now show by example that this is not the case. The matching outcome in Figure 11 illustrates that an incompleteinformation stable matching need not be complete-information stable, even though there are equal numbers of worker and firm types, and Ω is a set of permutations. There are two types of firms and two types of workers. Premuneration values are given by ν wf = φ wf = wf . This is not complete-information stable, as worker d and firm c can form a blocking pair. In the incompleteinformation setting, any payment at which worker d is willing to match with firm c also makes worker b willing to match with firm c. Firm c thus cannot preclude the possibility that the worker type in a candidate blocking pair is 2, and hence cannot be sure of the profitability of the proposed block. This, in turn, ensures that the outcome is incomplete-information stable.
More formally, let E be the set of allocations in which μ, p, and f are as shown in Figure 11 , worker a is known to be of type 2, and the types of workers b, c, and d are drawn from the set of permutations of (2 2 4). Then E is a self-stabilizing set. Notice that this self-stabilizing set contains no completeinformation stable outcome-while we often find it convenient to show that an allocation is incomplete-information stable by pairing it in a self-stabilizing set with a complete-information stable outcome, the presence of the latter is not necessary. Indeed, taking Σ to be the support of our self-stabilizing set E, no complete-information stable allocation can give rise to the price function p.
The difficulty in this example is that the observables, namely, firms' types and payments, are the same for all firms of type 3. As a result, neither an outside observer who knows only that a firm is type 3, nor a different firm of type 3, can ascertain the type of worker with whom the firm is matched.
This difficulty is eliminated if either all firms or all workers have different types (the proof is in Appendix C.2): PROPOSITION 6: Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and assume Ω is a set of permutations. Incomplete-information stability coincides with completeinformation stability if either 1. different firms have different types, or 2. different workers have different types.
The first case (different firms have different types) is straightforward, since now (observable) firm types perfectly reveal worker types in an assortative matching. For the second case (different workers have different types), when different workers have different types, the payment p, which is observable, is fully informative about worker type regardless of firm types. The sufficient conditions given in this proposition are not necessary, and can be slightly weakened at the cost of somewhat more complicated statements. For example, it suffices that under every assortative matching, there is no overlap between strings of identical worker types and strings of identical firm types.
STABILITY AND PRICING
In this section, we examine the connection between the set of stable outcomes and allocations that we might see in a market environment. Section 4.1.2 established conditions under which an inefficient matching is not incompleteinformation stable. The instability will arise because there is a payment for some unmatched pair at which both will be sure they gain. We now examine whether one can rely on a price system to ensure that inefficient outcomes will similarly not persist. We introduce a notion of price-sustainable outcomes in order to answer this question. The basic idea is to formulate a notion analogous to the stability notion for incomplete-information problems above, but requiring that the decisions of both workers and firms be mediated through market prices rather than direct contact.
We might expect price sustainability to be either more or less demanding than incomplete-information stability. Objections to a candidate allocation under price sustainability must be made at the existing prices, constraining the ability to convey information and making it more difficult to block an allocation. However, blocking an allocation under price sustainability requires only a market imbalance, arising from a single agent's preference for a different match, rather than the double coincidence of wants required under incomplete-information stability.
As with our notion of incomplete-information stability, our focus is on matches that have already been formed. We do not address how such matches and the transfers within the match arose. This distinguishes our notion from notions of competitive equilibrium, since there is no privileged outcome in a typical model of competitive equilibria.
The Economy
The "commodities" in a two-sided matching market are "partnerships" of the form (i j), denoting a match between worker i and firm j, with (i ∅) denoting an unmatched worker i and (∅ j) denoting unmatched firm j. Each firm j can demand at most one partnership, of the form (i j ) for some i, and each worker i can similarly supply at most one partnership, of the form (i j). Let P be a price matrix P : I × J → R associating a price with each match of the form (i j), while defining the prices for staying unmatched as P i∅ = P ∅j = 0 for any i ∈ I and j ∈ J.
A price-taking matching outcome specifies the partnerships that are traded, that is, a matching function μ : I → J ∪ {∅}, and a price matrix P.
DEFINITION 8: A price-taking matching outcome (μ P w f) is individually rational if ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + P i μ(i) ≥ 0 for any i ∈ I and φ w(μ −1 (j)) f(j) − P μ −1 (j) j ≥ 0 for any j ∈ J.
Note that the definition of individual rationality presumes that each firm knows the type of the worker she is matched with, consistent with the idea that we are considering an existing match.
Price-Sustainable Matching
Intuitively, a price-sustainable matching outcome requires that workers and firms choose their partnerships optimally, given fixed prices, and market clearing. Worker i must find it optimal to match with μ(i) at a price P i μ(i) instead of matching with a firm j = μ(i) at a price P ij or staying alone at a price 0, with a similar requirement for firms (taking into account each firm's incomplete information about workers with whom the firm is not matched). Market clearing is explicit in the definition of μ : I → J ∪ {∅}.
DEFINITION 9: Fix a nonempty set of individually rational price-taking matching outcomes Ψ . A price-taking matching outcome (μ P w f) ∈ Ψ is Ψ -price-sustainable (or simply Ψ -sustainable) if there is no i ∈ I and j ∈ J for which
and P i μ(i ) = P i μ(i ) and P i j = P i j ∀i ∈ I Each firm knows the type of her own worker and every agent knows the price of any partnership (i μ(i)), which is to say that agents know the prices of the goods that are traded. We also assume that each worker i knows the price of each partnership (i j) and each firm j knows the price of each partnership (i j ). Hence, each agent knows the prices of all of the goods in his or her consumption set. We do not assume that firm j knows the prices of partnerships (i j ) for which j = μ(i), so that j does not know the prices of partnerships that are not traded and that j could not trade.
A price-taking matching outcome fails to be Ψ -sustainable if some matched agent prefers to stay unmatched or if some agent wants to deviate to a different match at the equilibrium price for that match, regardless of whether the other side wants to accept the agent or not.
Since firm j does not observe workers' types (other than j's current match), we must again consider firm j's beliefs about worker types. For sustainability to fail because a firm has a superior alternative transaction, this alternative must be superior for every type assignment w and price matrix P satisfying the three criteria given in Definition 9: (i) the type assignment must be consistent with matching outcomes in the set Ψ , a restriction that will become operational in the iterative argument we construct next; (ii) the type assignment must not contradict what the firm j already knows at the stage, that is, must assign to firm j the type μ −1 (j) of worker with whom firm j is matched; (iii) P must be consistent with the prices the firm knows.
DEFINITION 10: Let Ψ 0 be the set of all individually rational price-taking matching outcomes. For k ≥ 1, define
The set of price-sustainable outcomes is given by
If (μ P w f) is a price-sustainable outcome, the outcome (μ P) is a pricesustainable allocation at (w f).
Many rounds of iteration may be required before the process introduced in Definition 10 reaches the set of price-sustainable outcomes (we provide an illustration in Supplemental Material Section O.2.1).
We can compare our notion of a price-sustainable matching to a variety of formulations of competitive equilibrium with incomplete information. Radner (1979) introduced a notion of competitive equilibrium for economies with incomplete information, showing that (generically) competitive equilibrium prices reveal all asymmetric information. Every agent consumes every good in Radner's model, making it reasonable to assume that the prices of all goods are common knowledge, whereas most of the goods are untraded in our case, and we do not assume that the agents have common knowledge of the prices of untraded goods. Hatfield, Kominers, Nichifor, Ostrovsky, and Westkamp (2013) examined a notion of competitive equilibrium for a completeinformation economy in which it is possible (but not necessarily the case) that every agent consumes every good, and in which all prices are known, whether the goods involved are traded or not.
As in the case of stability, there is a convenient fixed-point characterization of price-sustainable outcomes. DEFINITION 11: A nonempty set of individually rational price-taking matching outcomes C is self-sustaining if every (μ P w f) ∈ C is C-sustainable.
The following result (proven in Supplemental Material Section O.2.2) is analogous to its stability counterpart.
LEMMA 3: The set of price-sustainable outcomes Ψ ∞ is self-sustaining. If C is self-sustaining, then C ⊂ Ψ ∞ .
By virtue of this lemma, to show that (μ P w f) is price-sustainable it suffices to find a set C that is self-sustaining and contains (μ P w f).
Stable and Price-Sustainable Matching Outcomes
In a price-sustainable matching outcome, firms draw inferences about workers' types from prices. However, the assumption that all transactions must occur at the candidate prices limits the inferences firms can draw. In a stable matching outcome, there are no restrictions on the payments that might be involved in a candidate blocking pair. This allows more information to be revealed. Greater information revelation makes it easier for pairs to identify beneficial deviations, and hence the stability requirement is more demanding than that of price sustainability. As a result, the set of stable matching outcomes is a subset of the set of price-sustainable outcomes. Supplemental Material Section O.2.3 proves the following.
We now illustrate that stability can strictly refine price-sustainable outcomes. In particular, there are price-sustainable outcomes that are not incompleteinformation stable. Suppose the premuneration values are given by ν wf = wf and φ wf = 2 + wf . Suppose, moreover, that Ω contains two type vectors: w = (3 2) and w = (1 2). Consider the matching outcomes (μ P w f) and (μ P w f) given in Figure 12 .
Note first that the singleton set {(μ P w f)} is self-sustainable: For example, if firm b takes worker a instead, firm b gets payoff π f d b = 2 + wf − P ab = 2 + (1 · 2) − 0 = 4. In the outcome (μ P w f), firm b is uncertain of the type of worker a. We use w to enforce firm b's optimization. Hence by deviating, the firm cannot rule out a payoff of 4.
Note that (μ p w f) cannot be incomplete-information stable, where p is the restriction of P, because the matching outcome is not efficient. Consider a proposed blocking pair consisting of worker a and firm b, and a payment of 1. Note that the price is P ab = 0. This offer differentiates worker type 3 from worker type 1. To see this, note that the former's payoff by this deviation is 7, larger than 6, the payoff from the candidate matching; while the latter's payoff is 3, less than 4, the payoff from the candidate matching. Since worker type 3 can reveal its type, firm type 2 obtains a payoff of 7 by matching with this worker at a price 1. -Example of a price-sustainable matching outcome that is not incomplete-information stable. There is a single price matrix. Worker i's payoff from matching with firm j = i is denoted π wd i ; firm j's payoff from matching with worker i = j is denoted π f d j .
Since Ω = {w w } = {(3 2) (1 2)}, at w, firm b cannot rule out a payoff of 4 (implied by w ) from matching with worker a.
DISCUSSION
Necessary Conditions
Our analysis begins with a notion of stability of a match in an incompleteinformation environment rather than with a process by which matches form. We build into our stability notion the requirement that agents make use of all of the information they can infer from the common knowledge that the matching is unblocked. Our interpretation of this common knowledge is that the agents see a match that persists over time, infer that there are no blocking opportunities, that others also know there are no blocking opportunities, and so on. In a similar spirit, Forges (1994) and Holmström and Myerson (1983) studied mechanism design problems with the constraint that the outcome should be free from objections players might make based on information revealed by the mechanism.
We view our notion of stability as capturing necessary conditions for an outcome to be the potential product of a matching process. In this sense, our work is most closely related to the literature on the core, particularly the core in incomplete-information problems.
There are different definitions of the core with incomplete information, each of which is meant to capture the idea that a core outcome should not be subject to objections by coalitions of agents, making different assumptions about what information a coalition might use in evaluating outcomes and formulating objections. Wilson (1978) proposed two polar cases, the first being that agents could share all information any member of the coalition had and the second being that agents could share only the information that was common knowledge. The first of these ignores the incentive constraints that might inhibit complete sharing, while the second seems overly restrictive about what information might be shared. Dutta and Vohra (2005) considered a middle ground in which coalitions are allowed to coordinate their objections by inferring information from the objection being contemplated. That is, if a coalition contemplates a coordinated objection to a proposed outcome, each agent in the coalition understands that his objection is irrelevant unless all other agents in the coalition agree to the coordinated objection. In essence, agents are able to make "conditional" offers to other agents that have no effect unless the offer is accepted by the other agents. 8 While our analysis is quite similar in spirit, there are important differences. In Dutta and Vohra (2005) , the inferences come only from the hypothesis that other agents are willing to participate in a blocking coalition. In our terms, these are "first-round" inferences. In contrast, our model also allows agents to make second-round inferences-they may make inferences from the fact that other agents do not block (which is not the case in Dutta and Vohra (2005) ). Our agents continue, making third-round inferences, and fourth-round inferences, and so on. In the end, our agents make all possible inferences consistent with the common knowledge of the stability of the matching. We believe that this feature, distinguishing our work from the literature, is vital to achieving a stability notion that both captures a suitably rich process of information inference and is consistent with existence.
The process of drawing iterated inferences could also appear in other contexts, leading to analogous notions of incomplete-information stability, even if the details of the inferences would differ. For example, a marriage model is a special case of our model in which there are no transfers. The absence of transfers would make it more difficult for an agent to convey information through a proposed block, precluding a result analogous to Lemma 2, and hence we would expect the set of incomplete-information stable outcomes to be relatively large, but the structure of the analysis carries through unchanged.
In keeping with our interpretation of stability as characterizing a persisting outcome, we assume that firms know the type of their current partners. In contrast, it is common in the literature to assume that the market contains only unmatched agents, with no distinguished pairs that know one another's identities, and with matched agents leaving the market to be replaced by new agents (as in, for example, Myerson (1995) ).
Origins
In a context of complete information, it is natural to combine the study of stable matchings with the study of the process by which such matchings are formed. The deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) , for example, can be used to construct direct mechanisms with stable equilibrium outcomes. 9 However, as Roth and Vande Vate (1990, p. 1475 ) noted, many matching markets do not make use of centralized mechanisms. Roth and Vande Vate (1990) analyzed a process that allows randomly chosen blocking pairs to match and showed that the process converges to a stable matching, though they did not model the incentives facing the agents throughout this process. 10 Lauermann and Nöldeke (2014) examined a model in which the members of two populations are continually matched into pairs, with each pair either agreeing to form (and leaving the market) or returning to the unmatched pool, and with agents choosing throughout so as to maximize their expected payoffs. 11 Lauermann and Nöldeke (2014) showed that the equilibria of this process converge to the set of stable outcomes, if, but only if, there is a unique stable outcome. Even under complete information, we cannot be assured of convergence to a stable outcome when there are multiple such outcomes.
Under incomplete information, the connection between stable matches and the process by which stable matches are formed is yet less obvious. In the process of encountering others and accepting or rejecting matches, the agents are likely to learn about their environment. As a result, the information structure prevailing at the end of the matching process will typically differ from that at the beginning. Explaining the process leading to a stable matching thus requires specifying the matching mechanics as well as the initial configuration of incomplete information. Our intuition provides few clues as to the relationship between the concluding specification of information, the original information configuration, and the intervening process.
One branch of the literature has responded by focusing on centralized mechanisms. For example, one could again consider a direct revelation mechanism in which the announced preferences are inputs to the deferred acceptance algorithm. Rather than considering Nash equilibria, one now examines Bayes Nash equilibria of the incomplete-information game. Roth (1989) did this for the case that agents know their own preferences for partners, but do not know potential partners' preferences. He showed that some important qualitative features of the equilibria in complete information do not carry over to incomplete information. There exists no mechanism with the property that at least one of its equilibria is always stable with respect to the true preferences at every realization of the game. In other words, any mechanism that might be employed will sometimes result in a match in which there will be an unmatched pair, each of whom knows they would prefer that match to the mechanism's match. Thus, even in what would seem to be the simplest extension to incomplete information, in which all agents know the value to them of potential partners, the link between the strategic issue of how matches are formed and the stability of matches is broken. Dizdar and Moldovanu (2012) identified conditions under which, given incomplete information and nontransferable utility, a mechanism exists that invariably yields complete-information stable outcomes.
A number of papers have examined decentralized procedures for forming matches. This work shares with ours the necessity of identifying the inferences agents can draw from the behavior of other agents. Chade (2006) analyzed a model in which agents observe a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate. In this environment, agents' matching decisions must incorporate not only information about a partner's attribute conveyed by the noisy signal, but also information about a partner's type given their acceptance decision. Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2010) studied a two-sided matching problem with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. They cast their model as one of matching students to colleges when students have complete information about colleges. Colleges care about students' characteristics, but get only noisy signals about those characteristics. Other colleges also get signals about students' characteristics, and as a consequence, the set of offers a student gets conveys information about his or her characteristics. Chakraborty, Citanna, and Ostrovsky (2010) showed that when the entire realized matching outcome is publicly observable, stable mechanisms do not generally exist. The instability stems from colleges learning about student qualities from the observable match, given the mechanism. In their model, colleges may learn differently under different mechanisms; hence a matching may be stable under some mechanisms but not under others. Their approach was to define stability of matching mechanisms rather than stable matches. We similarly assume in our work that the match is publicly observable, but define stability for a match without reference to any mechanism from which the matching arose. 12 12 A number of other papers have studied specific dynamic matching games with uncertainty about the valuation of others. Lee (2004) showed that interdependencies in valuations can lead to adverse selection in a college admission problem. Chade, Lewis, and Smith (2014) and Nagypal (2004) analyzed college application models when students are uncertain about their own quality and applications are costly. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) studied a model in which agents have private information about their own qualities and are matched assortatively based on costly signals they send. Ehlers and Masso (2007) studied mechanisms for matching when preferences are unknown, showing that truth telling is an equilibrium only if every possible preference profile implies a singleton core under complete information.
Premuneration Values
Why do we work with premuneration values and prices, rather than simply abstract divisions of the surplus? Indeed, given that prices are simply transfers and efficiency depends only on the matching pattern, why not simply ignore prices?
The importance of premuneration values was stressed by Samuelson (2012, 2013) , who examined a model in which a continuum of sellers (the counterpart of firms) and a continuum of buyers (the counterpart of workers) simultaneously invest in attributes (the counterpart of types), and then competitively match, with payoffs determined by premuneration values adjusted by a payment. While there are significant modeling differences between the models in that paper and here, the two models share the property that the attributes of all the agents on one side of the matching market are public, while those of all the agents on the other side are private. An important feature of Samuelson (2012, 2013) is that premuneration values, which are typically irrelevant in complete-information environments, become important in the presence of incomplete information. In particular, premuneration values play a critical role in determining whether the post-investment matching outcomes create the incentives required for agents to undertake efficient investments. The modeling assumptions in the current paper reflect a belief that people often undertake investments before entering matching markets, and that premuneration values and payments affect investment incentives.
Premuneration values will also play an important role in studying how stable outcomes might arise. For example, one might think that an auction-like process could mediate the matching in our environment, since auctions are a common mechanism for matching buyers to sellers in one-sided asymmetric information environments. Consider the following setting and second-price auction mechanism.
Let (w 1 w 2 w n ) and (f 1 f 2 f n ) be vectors of worker and firm types to be matched, with the firm types being common knowledge and increasing in index, and the worker types being private information. The premuneration value for worker type w i matched with firm type f j is w i f j , as is the firm's premuneration value. Consider a direct revelation mechanism defined as follows. Let (ŵ 1 ŵ 2 ŵ n ) be the announced worker types. Denote the kth-order statistic of the reports byŵ (k) . The direct mechanism matches the lowest announced worker type with the lowest firm, and charges the worker a price of p 1 = 0. The second lowest announced worker type is matched with the second lowest firm type and charged p 2 =ŵ (1) · (f 2 − f 1 ), the increase that the lowest worker would have had for matching with this firm. The kth worker is matched with the kth firm and is charged p k =ŵ (k−1) (f k − f k−1 ) + p k−1 , that is, the increase in the payoff to the worker just "beneath" the kth worker from being matched with firm k rather than firm k − 1.
It is straightforward to show that it is a dominant strategy for workers to announce their types truthfully. The difficulty is that this process need not generate stable outcomes. Consider the case in which workers' types are (1 2 3), and firms' types are (1 1 1). All firms will then be matched with workers at price 0. But notice that the values to the three firms will be (1 2 3), since the firms' premuneration values depend on the type of the worker. The combination of firm type 1 and worker type 2 can then form a blocking pair, as can firm type 1 and worker type 3, as well as firm type 2 and worker type 3.
It is an important component of this instability result that sellers' premuneration values are nontrivial functions of buyers' characteristics. There would be no problem with stability if sellers did not care with which buyer they were matched. 13 Interestingly, Google auctions locations on web pages to advertisers, thus operating a mechanism that matches buyers (advertisers) and sellers (web page owners). This auction would generate stable outcomes if sellers received a flat fee for their spots, rendering them indifferent over the buyers with whom they are matched. However, the sellers' total revenue depends on the number of times an ad generates a click, ensuring that the sellers have premuneration values that are nontrivial functions of buyers' characteristics. Presumably, this fee structure reflects buyers' uncertainty about the quality of the web pages over which they are bidding, protecting them from paying high prices for sites that generate little traffic. In the process, however, the fee structure opens the possibility that the resulting outcome will not be stable.
Extensions
There are two obvious directions for extending our analysis. First, our notion of incomplete-information stability allows for deviations by a single pair, but not deviations by larger coalitions. Under complete information, the restriction to pairwise blocking coalitions is innocuous, but this is no longer the case under incomplete information. Expanding the analysis beyond pairwise blocking coalitions will require taking a stand on what inferences agents can draw from the hypothesis that the entire coalition is willing to participate. While the details are nontrivial, many of our results will clearly carry over to models that allow larger deviating coalitions. If the set of allowed coalitions is increased, more outcomes will be blocked, and consequently, the set of unblocked outcomes will be (weakly) smaller. However, any plausible stability notion will leave complete-information stable outcomes unblocked. Thus, our results that incomplete-information stable outcomes exist and are a superset of complete-information stable outcomes, as well as that under quite general conditions incomplete-information stable outcomes are efficient, will continue to hold when more coalitions are allowed. Similarly, the equal treatment of equals may still fail, and the continuity of payoffs when there is little asymmetry of information will hold.
Second, we have examined one-to-one matching. The analysis could be readily extended to simple cases of many-to-one matching. For example, suppose that firms can hire more than one worker, but that each worker cares only about the firm with whom he is matched (and not about the characteristics of the other workers matched with that firm). Suppose further that the firm's payoff is an additively separable function of the types of workers it hires. We could then find generalizations of our monotonicity and supermodularity assumptions ensuring an efficient match. Extensions to richer many-to-one matching models is an obvious next step.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS FOR SECTION 3
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Only statement 3 of the lemma requires proof, the others being obvious from the definition. Suppose, en route to a contradiction, that E is self-stabilizing, but its closure, E, is not. There is then an outcome (μ p w f) ∈ E, a pair of unmatched agents (i j), and a payment p such that ν w(i) f(j) + p > ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) (A.1) and
Since Ω is finite, the set of worker type assignments that satisfy conditions (A.2)-(A.5) is unchanged for p < p but arbitrarily close. Thus, there is a p < p such that, for all p ∈ (p p ), the lower payment p also satisfies (A.1) and (A.2)-(A.5) for (i j).
Let p n → p be a sequence satisfying (μ p n w f) ∈ E (recall footnote 6). It is then immediate from (A.1) that there exists an N such that, for all n > N and all p ∈ (p p ), ν w(i) f(j) + p > ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p n i μ(i) .
Since E is self-stabilizing, for all n > N, and all p ∈ (p p ), there exists w ∈ Ω, such that
Since Ω is finite, there exists w such that the above holds for infinitely many n > N and for two values p 1 < p 2 ∈ (p p ). This yields the desired contradiction, since the w obtained violates conditions (A. (1) We first show that Σ ∞ contains every self-stabilizing set E. By definition, E ⊂ Σ 0 . Suppose E ⊂ Σ k−1 , for k ≥ 1, and (μ p w f) ∈ E. Since E is self-stabilizing, (μ p w f) is E-stable, and so is Σ k−1 -stable (because Σ k−1 is a larger set), and so is in Σ k by the definition of Σ k . Induction shows that E ⊂ Σ ∞ .
(2) We next argue that Σ ∞ is a self-stabilizing set. Suppose not. By construction, Σ ∞ ⊂ Σ 0 and so every outcome (μ p w f) ∈ Σ ∞ is individually rational. Then, there is an outcome (μ p w f) ∈ Σ ∞ that is Σ ∞ -blocked. In particular, there is an unmatched pair (i j) and payment p ∈ R such that (1) and conditions (2)-(5) hold for Σ = Σ ∞ . Since (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k is Σ k -stable for each k ≥ 0, and ((i j) p) satisfies (1), for Σ = Σ k conditions (2)-(5) must fail. That is, for each k, φ w k (i) f(j) − p ≤ φ w k (μ −1 (j)) f(j) − p μ −1 (j) j for some w k such that (a) (μ p w k f) ∈ Σ k , (b) w k (μ −1 (j)) = w(μ −1 (j)), and (c) ν w k (i) f(j) + p > ν w k (i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) . Since w k is drawn from a finite set of type vectors, there is a w * that appears infinitely often in the sequence {w k } k . Since Σ k is a decreasing sequence of sets, and (μ p w * f) ∈ Σ k for infinitely many k, 1 (j) ), and (c) ν w * (i) f(j) + p > ν w * (i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) . Thus, conditions (2)-(5) fail for Σ = Σ ∞ , the desired contradiction.
(3) We have established that Σ ∞ is the largest self-stabilizing set. Meanwhile, the closure of a self-stabilizing set is self-stabilizing. Hence, Σ ∞ = Σ ∞ . 
where ε > 0 will be determined later. The first required inequality (6) with p = p ε is ν wf + ν w * f * + ε > ν wf * + ν w * f for any w ≥ w * which is immediate when w = w * . When w > w * , it follows from the assumption of strict supermodularity (since f > f * ). Since (μ p) is an individually rational matching, ν w * f * + p * ≥ 0. Hence, for any w ≥ w * , f > f * , and p ε defined in (B.1), (7).
After substituting for p = p ε defined in (B.1), the inequality (8) becomes
For ε sufficiently small, this inequality follows from the assumption of strict supermodularity (since f * < f ). Inequalities (6)-(8) immediately hold for p ∈ (ν w * f * + p * − ν w * f p ε ]. The proof for the case that w * is unmatched is similar.
B.2. Preliminaries: An Inductive Notion of Assortativity
We first formulate an inductive notion of assortativity. We write the finite set of possible worker and firm types as W = {w 1 w 2 w K } and F = {f 1 f 2 f L }, with both w k and f increasing in their indices. To deal with unmatched agents, we introduce the notation f(∅) = w(∅) = ∅, with the conventions ∅ < w k and ∅ < f for any k and . The function f • μ is weakly comonotone with w on I if f(μ(i)) ≥ f(μ(i )) for all i i ∈ I satisfying w(i) > w(i ). matching (μ p w f) is worker-assortative if it is (K − 1)th-order worker-assortative; it is firm-assortative if it is (L − 1)thorder firm-assortative. A matching (μ p w f) is assortative if it is both workerassortative and firm-assortative. worker types, w: 1 2 3 4 firm types, f: 1 2 ∅ ∅ FIGURE B.1.-A matching that is first-order, but is not second-order, worker-assortative. There are four workers and two firms, W = {1 2 3 4} and F = {1 2}, and workers and firms have different types.
Note that the worker-assortativity order is defined in terms of the grand set of all worker types W , not the ex post realized types; similarly for firmassortativity. For example, if w(i) = w 1 for all i, that is, no worker has the lowest possible type w 1 , then (μ p w f) is trivially first-order worker-assortative by definition. In addition, kth-order worker-assortativity requires not only that the k lowest worker types {w 1 w k } are matched with firms assortatively, but also that any workers with a higher type w > w k are matched with (weakly) higher firm types. For example, the matching in Figure B .1 is not second-order worker-assortative even though the lowest two worker types are matched assortatively. Figure B .2 displays the two nontrivial second-order worker-assortative matchings.
In addition to the first matching displayed in Figure B .2, there is a trivial worker-assortative matching in which no worker or firm is matched as well as the two worker-assortative matchings displayed in Figure B .3.
The first matching in Figure B .3 is not firm-assortative and hence not assortative. The first matching in Figure B .2, the second matching in Figure B .3, and the trivial matching in which no worker or firm is matched are both worker-and firm-assortative. Note that our definition of assortative matching does not exclude the case that all agents remain unmatched. By Definition B.1, this matching is third-order worker-assortative and first-order firm-assortative, and hence assortative. This case is important because if, for example, ν wf = φ wf = −1, everyone staying unmatched is the only individually rational, and hence the only efficient, matching. But, if ν wf = φ wf = 1, this assortative matching is not efficient. In fact, it is easy to see that any assortative matching can be efficient for the appropriate specification of premuneration values.
The following straightforward observation delineates the difference between assortativity and efficiency (we omit the proof). μ p w f) is not efficient, then either there exists a matched worker-firm pair that generates a negative surplus, that is, there exists i ∈ I such that μ(i) ∈ J and ν w(i) f(μ −1 (i)) + φ w(i) f(μ −1 (i)) < 0; or there exist an unmatched worker and an unmatched firm who could have generated a positive surplus by matching together, that is, there exist a worker i ∈ I and a firm j ∈ J such that μ(i) = μ −1 (j) = ∅ and ν w(i) f(j) + φ w(i) f(j) > 0.
The following observation is useful in our inductive proofs. w k w k+1 }}. Moreover, for all w > w k+1 , f • μ is weakly comonotone with w on {i : w(i) = w k+1 w}. If there is a worker i satisfying w(i) = w k+1 , then it is immediate that f • μ is weakly comonotone with w on {i : w(i) ∈ {w 1 w k w k+1 w}}. Suppose then that w(i) = w k+1 for all i ∈ I. Then, for all w > w k+1 , f • μ is trivially weakly comonotone with w on {i : w(i) = w k+1 w} for any f. Nonetheless, since (μ p w f) is kth-order worker-assortative, we immediately have that (μ p w f) is (k + 1)th-order worker-assortative, since, for all w > w k+1 , the sets {i : w(i) ∈ {w 1 w k w}} and {i : w(i) ∈ {w 1 w k w k+1 w}} agree. The proof for firm-assortativity is identical.
Q.E.D.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Worker-Assortativity
Without loss of generality, assume worker and firm indices are positive integers and the true type assignment (w f) is such that w : I → W and f : J → F are weakly increasing. Thus, players with lower identities have lower types. (We still need to keep in mind that the firms do not know w )
We use an induction argument, based on the following two lemmas. then (μ p) is first-order worker-assortative under (w f).
PROOF: Suppose, to the contrary, that there is some (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 not first-order worker-assortative. Then, by definition, f • μ is not weakly comonotone with w on {i : w(i) ∈ {w 1 w}} for some w > w 1 . That is, there exist two workers, say 1 and 2, such that w(2) > w(1) = w 1 but f(μ(2)) < f(μ(1)) = ∅. PROOF: Suppose not, that is, μ(2) = ∅. Since (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 0 , worker 1's individual rationality in the matching outcome (μ p w f) implies that the payoff of firm μ(1) in this matching outcome is bounded above by the total surplus generated, π f μ(1) ≤ ν w 1 f(μ(1)) + φ w 1 f(μ(1)) . Consider the worker-firm pair (2 μ(1)) with a payment p. By Lemma 2 (taking w * = w(2) and f = f(μ(1))), there exists ε > 0 such that, for −ν w(2) f(μ(1)) < p ≤ −ν w(2) f(μ(1)) + ε, ν w f(μ(1)) + p > 0 for any w ≥ w(2) and (B.2) ν w f(μ(1)) + p ≤ 0 for any w < w(2) (B.3) Worker 2 is better off because he gets a positive payoff, from (B.2); firm μ(1) will assign probability 1 that the deviating worker's type is at least w(2) because of (B.2) and (B.3). Hence, the expected payoff of firm μ(1) in this deviation is bounded below by φ w(2) f(μ(1)) − p. By taking p close to −ν w(2) f(μ(1)) , this lower bound can be made arbitrarily close to φ w(2) f(μ(1)) + ν w(2) f(μ(1)) . Since w(2) > w 1 , strict supermodularity implies that φ w(2) f(μ(1)) + ν w(2) f(μ(1)) > ν w 1 f(μ(1)) +φ w 1 f(μ(1)) ≥ π f μ(1) . Hence (2 μ(1)) forms a blocking pair with price p. This contradicts the assumption that (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 .
CLAIM B.2: If (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 , w(2) > w(1) = w 1 , and f(μ(2)) < f(μ(1)) = ∅, then φ w(2) f(μ(1)) + ν w(2) f(μ(1)) ≤ ν w(2) f(μ(2)) + p 2 μ(2) + φ w 1 f(μ(1)) − p 1 μ(1) (B.4) PROOF: Consider the worker-firm pair (2 μ(1)) with payment p given by p = ν w(2) f(μ(2)) + p 2 μ(2) − ν w(2) f(μ(1)) + ε For sufficiently small ε > 0, by Lemma 2, every worker with type strictly below w(2) prefers his current match.
Since (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 , firm μ(1) rejects worker 2 and p. That is, the firm must not be strictly better off in the new match. Hence, φ w f(μ(1)) − p ≤ φ w 1 f(μ(1)) − p 1 μ(1) for some w ≥ w(2) (B.5)
Since φ wf is increasing in w and f , the statement in (B.5) holds if and only if φ w(2) f(μ(1)) − p ≤ φ w 1 f(μ(1)) − p 1 μ(1) Substituting for p, φ w(2) f(μ(1)) − (ν w(2) f(μ(2)) + p 2 μ(2) − ν w(2) f(μ(1)) + ε)
≤ φ w 1 f(μ(1)) − p 1 μ(1) implying (B.4).
Q.E.D. CLAIM B.3: If (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 , w(2) > w(1) = w 1 , and f(μ(2)) < f(μ(1)) = ∅, then ν w 1 f(μ(2)) + φ w 1 f(μ(2)) ≤ (ν w 1 f(μ(1)) + p 1 μ(1) ) + (φ w(2) f(μ(2)) − p 2 μ(2) ) (B.6) PROOF: If the inequality in (B.6) did not hold, we can find q ∈ R such that ν w 1 f(μ(2)) + q > ν w 1 f(μ(1)) + p 1 μ(1) and (B.7)
φ w 1 f(μ(2)) − q > φ w(2) f(μ(2)) − p 2 μ(2) (B.8)
Since φ is increasing and w 1 is the smallest type, (B.8) implies that min w∈W φ w f(μ(2)) − q > φ w(2) f(μ(2)) − p 2 μ(2) (B.9) Hence, (B.7) and (B.9) imply (1 μ(2)) is a blocking pair, contradicting (μ p w f) ∈ Σ 1 .
Finally, we combine Claims B.2 and B.3. Adding the two inequalities, we obtain (ν w 1 f(μ(2)) + ν w(2) f(μ(1)) ) + (φ w 1 f(μ(2)) + φ w(2) f(μ(1)) ) ≤ (ν w 1 f(μ(1)) + ν w(2) f(μ(2)) ) + (φ w 1 f(μ(1)) + φ w(2) f(μ(2)) )
Recalling that w 1 < w(2) and f(μ(2)) < f(μ(1)), this inequality contradicts strict supermodularity. This completes the proof of Lemma B.3.
LEMMA B.4: For any k ≥ 1, if (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k , then (μ p w f) is kth-order worker-assortative. PROOF: We proceed by induction. Suppose the claim holds for k ≥ 1 (from Lemma B.3, the claim holds for k = 1). Suppose, to the contrary, that (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k+1 , and (μ p w f) is not (k + 1)th-order worker-assortative. There then exist two workers i < i such that worker i's type is w(i) = w k+1 < w(i ) and f(μ(i)) > f(μ(i )). The proof of Claim B.1 shows (with obvious modifications) that μ(i ) = ∅. CLAIM B.4: If (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k+1 , w(i) = w k+1 < w(i ), and f(μ(i)) > f(μ(i )), then ν w(i ) f(μ(i)) + φ w(i ) f(μ(i)) ≤ ν w(i ) f(μ(i )) + p i μ(i ) + φ w(i) f(μ(i)) − p i μ(i) (B.10) PROOF: Worker i strictly prefers a block with firm μ(i) at a payment p := ν w(i ) f(μ(i )) + p i μ(i ) − ν w(i ) f(μ(i)) + ε for some small ε > 0, if and, by Lemma 2, only if, his type is at least w(i ). Since (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k+1 , (i μ(i)) together with p cannot make firm μ(i) better off for any consistent belief. Hence, there exists w ≥ w(i ) such that φ w f(μ(i)) − p ≤ φ w(i) f(μ(i)) − p i μ(i) By monotonicity of φ and w(i) < w(i ) ≤ w, we have φ w(i ) f(μ(i)) − p ≤ φ w(i) f(μ(i)) − p i μ(i) Substituting for p, we get (B.10).
CLAIM B.5: If (μ p w f) ∈ Σ k+1 , w(i) = w k+1 < w(i ), and f(μ(i)) > f(μ(i )), then ν w(i) f(μ(i )) + φ w(i) f(μ(i )) ≤ ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) + φ w(i ) f(μ(i )) − p i μ(i ) (B.11) PROOF: Suppose, to the contrary, that the claimed inequality does not hold. We can then find q ∈ R such that ν w(i) f(μ(i )) + q > ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) and (B.12) φ w(i) f(μ(i )) − q > φ w(i ) f(μ(i )) − p i μ(i ) (B.13) By monotonicity of φ, (B.13) implies φ w f(μ(i )) − q > φ w(i ) f(μ(i )) − p i μ(i ) for all w ≥ w(i) = w k+1 (B.14)
By the induction hypothesis, Σ k only contains outcomes that are kth-order worker-assortative. Consider the following set of worker type assignments: Ω = w ∈ Ω : μ p w f ∈ Σ k w i = w i ν w (i) f(μ(i )) + q > ν w (i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) > φ w(μ −1 (j)) f(j) − ν w(μ −1 (j)) f(j) − p μ −1 (j) j + ν w(μ −1 (j)) f(j ) > φ w(μ −1 (j)) f(j) − p μ −1 (j) j ≥ 0 where the three inequalities follow from substituting the upper bound of ε, the monotonicity of ν wf , and the individual rationality of the candidate matching.
Efficiency
Suppose (μ p w f) ∈ Σ ∞ is not efficient. Then by Lemma B.1, there are two cases:
(1) There exists i ∈ I such that μ(i) ∈ J and ν w(i) f(μ −1 (i)) + φ w(i) f(μ −1 (i)) < 0. This clearly violates individual rationality.
(2) There exist a worker i ∈ I and a firm j ∈ J such that μ(i) = μ −1 (j) = ∅ and ν w(i) f(j) + φ w(i) f(j) > 0. In this case, consider the potential blocking match of worker i and firm j with a payment p = −ν w(i) f(j) + ε, where ε > 0 is to be determined later. Hence ν w(i) f(j) + p = ε > 0. If w(i) is the lowest worker type among W , then this payment will make both the worker and firm unambiguously better off if ε < ν w(i) f(j) + φ w(i) f(j) . If w(i) is not the lowest type, take So firm j will believe the worker has type at least w(i), and will expect a payoff bounded below by Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists ε > 0 such that, for any integer n > 0, there exist Ω n ⊂ ξ 1/n (w) and (μ n p n w n f) ∈ Σ ∞ (Ω n ) such that π(μ n p n w n f) / ∈ ξ ε (π(Σ ∞ ({w}))). We denote by · the Euclidean metric. Notice that w n − w → 0 as n → ∞. Hence, the boundedness of {w n } and the individual rationality of (μ n p n w n f) ∈ Σ ∞ (Ω n ) imply that the sequence {p n } is bounded. Notice also that (μ n p n w f) − (μ n p n w n f) → 0 as n → ∞. Since π(μ n p n w n f) / ∈ ξ ε (π(Σ ∞ ({w}))), it follows that, for sufficiently large n, π μ n p n w f / ∈ ξ ε/2 π Σ ∞ {w} (C.1)
Since there is a finite number of possible matchings, at least one (denoted μ) appears infinitely often in the sequence. Taking a subsequence if necessary, we may assume μ n is constant, equal to μ, and p n converges to some limit, denoted p. We then have from (C.1) that π(μ p w f) / ∈ π(Σ ∞ ({w})), that is, (μ p w f) is not complete-information stable.
Since individual rationality is satisfied along the sequence, it is trivially satisfied in the limit. Since (μ p w f) is not complete-information stable, there is a pair (i j) together with a price p ∈ R such that ν w(i) f(j) + p > ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) φ w(i) f(j) − p > φ w(i) f(μ(i)) − p i μ(i) Then, by continuity, there exists integer N 1 > 0 such that ν w(i) f(j) + p > ν w(i) f(μ(i)) + p i μ(i) φ w (i) f(j) − p > φ w(i) f(μ(i)) − p i μ(i) for any w ∈ ξ 1/N 1 (w) Further, by continuity, there exists integer N 2 > 0 such that, if n > N 2 , ν w n (i) f(j) + p > ν w n (i) f(μ n (i)) + p n i μ n (i) φ w (i) f(j) − p > φ w n (i) f(μ n (i)) − p n i μ n (i) for any w ∈ ξ 1/N 1 (w) Take n > max{N 1 N 2 }. Then, ν w n (i) f(j) + p > ν w n (i) f(μ n (i)) + p n i μ n (i) φ w (i) f(j) − p > φ w n (i) f(μ n (i)) − p n i μ n (i) for any w ∈ Ω n ⊂ ξ 1/N 1 (w) Therefore, (μ n p n w n f) / ∈ Σ ∞ (Ω n ). A contradiction.
